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Abstract: The development of new methods and rep­
resentations for temporal decision-making requires a 
principled basis for characterizing and measuring 
the flexibility of decision strategies in the face of 
uncertainty. Our goal in this paper is to provide a 
framework - not a theory - for observing how 
decision policies behave in the face of informational 
perturbations, to gain clues as to how they might 
behave in the face of unanticipated, possibly unartic­
ulated uncertainties. To this end, we find it beneficial 
to distinguish between two types of uncertainty: 
"Small World" uncertainty and "Large World" 
uncertainty. The first type can be resolved by posing 
an unambiguous question to a "clairvoyant," and is 
anchored on some well-defined aspect of a decision 
frame. The second type is more troublesome, yet it 
is often of greater interest when we address the issue 
of flexibility; this type of uncertainty can be resolved 
only by consulting a "psychic." We next observe that 
one approach to flexibility frequently used in the 
economics literature is already implicitly accounted 
for in the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) princi­
ple from decision theory. Though simple, the obser­
vation establishes the context for a more 
illuminating notion of flexibility, what we term flex­
ibility with respect to information revelation. We 
show how to perform flexibility analysis of a static 
(i.e., single period) decision problem using a simple 
example, and we observe that the most flexible alter­
native thus identified is not necessarily the MEU 
alternative. We extend our analysis for a dynamic 
(i.e., multi-period) model, and we demonstrate how 
to calculate the value of flexibility for decision strat­
egies that allow downstream revision of an upstream 
commitment decision. 
1.0 Flexibility, Uncertainty, and 
Information 
Researchers in decision-making under uncertainty have 
recognized the importance of developing models and 
methods that more adequately address the notion of time: 
How do decisions taken now shape or constrain decision 
opportunities confronted in the future? Whether we are 
building decision analyses to clarify human-oriented pol­
icy decisions or algorithms to approximate intelligent 
agency in a robot, the question poses a significant chal­
lenge for any methodology which claims to provide a 
complete, normative basis for action. Planning systems, 
for example, need rigorous methods for judging whether a 
particular plan is more "brittle" or less "flexible" than 
another, as well as sensible metrics for quantifying those 
features precisely. Decision consultants, meanwhile, 
increasingly focus on building strategies that create and 
sustain value for a decision maker or an organization over 
time, strategies that are somehow robust in the face of rap­
idly changing circumstances and unanticipated outcomes. 
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The reason we care about notions such as flexibility, brit­
tleness, and robustness in decision-making is that the 
world is uncertain. If the world were perfectly determinis­
tic -or even approximately so - we could simply order 
our actions to respond to future events using propositional 
logic. For the many problem areas where such reasoning 
falls short, we model uncertainty using the axiomatic 
framework of probability theory. Utility theory provides a 
normative basis for action using the probabilities assessed 
by a decision maker. Flexibility enters the discussion 
because we would like our actions to accommodate uncer­
tain outcomes, and even better, to respond to uncertainties 
that we perhaps do not explicitly consider at the time we 
make a decision. As the mechanism through which we 
reduce uncertainty, information ought to figure promi­
nently in any analysis of flexibility: given more informa­
tion, we might do otherwise and thereby achieve higher 
value; the revelation of information downstream of a deci­
sion often creates or constrains opportunities to respond 
effectively to our upstream commitments. 
Practicing decision analysts use a variety of sensitivity 
techniques to determine which sources of uncertainty 
weigh most heavily in the identification of optimal courses 
of action (see, for example, [Morgan and Henrion, 1990]). 
Deterministic perturbation, proximal analysis, and rank­
order correlation are useful tools for measuring the relative 
importance of different uncertainties in a decision model. 
Value of information is the most powerful approach to 
sensitivity analysis because it measures not just whether 
uncertainty in an input variable could affect the output 
value, but rather whether reducing uncertainty in the input 
variable could change the recommended decision. Recent 
research provides efficient techniques for estimating infor­
mation value in very large models [Chavez and Henrion, 
1994]. 
All such sensitivity methods, however, occupy a separate 
phase of the decision analysis cycle or a special function 
of a decision support system, in both cases usually at what 
we might call the back end. They tell a decision maker 
which uncertainties matter, but they do not provide a nec­
essary loop back to the front end: How should a decision 
maker use sensitivity measures to gain insight into the rec­
ommended action, or to craft better strategies? How 
should a decision maker use sensitivity results on vari­
ables to identify strengths and weaknesses in decisions? 
So far, sensitivity methods provide clues, but no compre-
hensive basis, for measuring the relative robustness or 
flexibility of competing plans. 
In this paper, we study the issue of flexibility using deci­
sion analysis. Our goal is to provide a framework - not a 
theory -for observing and measuring how decision poli­
cies respond to informational perturbations, to gain clues 
as to how they might respond to unanticipated, possibly 
unarticulated uncertainties. In Section 2, we distinguish 
between two central types of uncertainty, in an effort to 
delineate a more precise sense in which flexibility analysis 
is possible. In Section 3, we present and motivate a defini­
tion of flexibility developed in the economics literature, 
and we show how decision theory implicitly accommo­
dates it. In simple terms, decision theory delivers one type 
of flexibility -what we call flexibility with respect to 
values on outcomes (F vo>- "for free." Though simple, 
the analysis sets the stage for a more illuminating notion 
of flexibility which explicitly takes information and uncer­
tainty into account: flexibility with respect to informa­
tion revelation (F1a). In Section 4, we demonstrate how 
to measure this type of flexibility in a static (i.e., single 
period) decision model, using a canonical problem from 
decision analysis. We observe that the most flexible action 
thus identified is not necessarily the MEU (Maximum 
Expected Utility) alternative. In Section 5, we extend the 
analysis for a dynamic model which allows a downstream 
revision of an upstream commitment decision. 
2.0 Distinctions about Uncertainty 
We can think of flexibility generally as "the ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances" [Mandelbaum, 1978]. 
Changing circumstances are just the outcomes of random 
variables: for example, the interest rate suddenly dips, 
your car's electrical system suddenly blows a fuse, or your 
apartment is damaged in an earthquake. Adapting to 
changing circumstances requires that the actions you take 
now allow you to respond effectively to new discoveries or 
new situations in the future. As observed in [Ghemawat, 
1991], " ... a strategic option has flexibility value not 
because it is a sure thing but to the extent that it is an abun­
dant store of potentially valuable revision possibilities." 
For example, if I am attempting to decide what car to buy, 
I might buy a Jeep instead of a Cadillac if I anticipate hav­
ing to drive along treacherous mountain roads frequently 
in the future. If an agent is attempting to decide what 
resources to gather from its environment, it needs to deter-
mine which resources will best ensure its long-term sur­
vival given reasonable expectations about future states of 
the world. We find it useful to fix ideas as follows: 
"Flexibility is the ability to achieve greater value given the 
revelation of missing but knowable information down­
stream." 
2.1 Small Worlds, Large Worlds, Clairvoyants, 
and Psychics 
Missing but knowable information can assume several 
forms. In addressing issues of flexibility, we have found it 
useful to distinguish between two broad categories of 
information or uncertainty: "Small World" and "Large 
World."1 We use the term "Small World" to bound the 
type of uncertainty to which it corresponds: Small World 
uncertainty can be resolved by observing an outcome on a 
variable which is clearly and explicitly defined by a deci­
sion-making agent. Decision analysts often use the con­
cept of the clairvoyant to pose and resolve information 
questions. The clairvoyant is a thought experiment (similar 
to Maxwell's Demon, for example), a hypothetical person 
who can answer questions relevant to a decision problem. 
For example, if you are betting on coin flips, then the clair­
voyant can tell you the outcome of the next flip. The clair­
voyant cannot tell you whether you should consider 
betting on horses rather than coin flips. Nor can the clair­
voyant offer information, e.g., he cannot suddenly tell you 
that the next coin flip will turn up something besides heads 
or tails. He can only answer unambiguous questions of 
fact. 
Another type of missing but knowable information relates 
to those alternatives, uncertainties, or preferences that we 
have not explicitly defined or articulated. This type of 
information corresponds to Large World uncertainty. For 
example, knowing that the next coin flip will cause your 
opponent to suffer a heart attack at the gambling table cer­
tainly counts as missing, knowable information, but it 
probably is not anything we explicitly include in our bet­
ting analysis. In general, Large World uncertainties can be 
resolved only by posing open-ended questions to a psy­
chic: for example, "Will anything strange happen when I 
next flip this coin?" Hypothetical answer: "Yes, your 
opponent will suffer a heart attack while it is in the air." 
1. For treatment of a similar distinction, see [Laskey, 
1992a,b]. 
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Large World uncertainties are those uncertainties that we 
have not already specified, even though their outcomes 
could significantly affect the value we achieve. 
Missing but knowable information provided by a clairvoy­
ant corresponds exactly to the class of Small World uncer­
tainties. Missing but knowable information provided by a 
psychic corresponds exactly to the class of Large World 
uncertainties. 
2.2 Missionaries and cannibals revisited 
The Large World/Small World distinction is key because it 
draws the line between what's possible and what's infeasi­
ble for flexibility analysis. We worry about flexibility in 
decision-making because we want our decision strategies 
to be responsive to a range of uncertain outcomes. But 
such strategies can be responsive only with respect to 
uncertainty that we deliberately, explicitly articulate. 
It is perhaps useful to think of an analogue to the well­
known AI Frame Problem in this context: Suppose you are 
charged with the task of transporting a group of missionar­
ies safely between opposite sides of a river. Cannibals lurk 
in the bushes at both banks. A decision-analytic treatment 
of the problem would take account of the risks of encoun­
tering cannibals at different locations along the banks, 
given rustling movements in the bushes, say, and the dis­
utility of getting shot by a cannibal's arrow. In implement­
ing a decision strategy for transporting the missionaries, 
you might attempt to take action that flexibly accommo­
dates all manner of bizarre risks. For example, you might 
worry about the possibility of an oar snapping in half or 
the possibility of a sudden, violent thunderstorm erupting 
while you are crossing the river. 
Yet it is clearly impossible- and certainly impractical­
to include all such remotely relevant, low-probability 
uncertainties in your analysis. Suppose for the moment 
that you construct a plan flexible enough to handle a snap­
ping oar or a violent thunderstorm, and you begin to cross 
the river. In the middle of the river, your boat pops a leak 
and sinks; the missionaries drown and die, while the can­
nibals at the banks wail and wring their hands at their loss. 
Regardless of how flexible you thought your plan was, it 
certainly was not flexible enough to accommodate this 
bizarre circumstance. 
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It is important to observe that sometimes the unanticipated 
event can be beneficial. For example, the cannibals might 
be away for the wedding of their chieftain's daughter in a 
nearby village. Yet this is probably outside the realm of 
anything a reasonable person would include in a plan for 
transporting missionaries. Trying to accommodate all pos­
sible uncertainty - particularly Large World uncertainty 
-in flexibility analysis is infeasible, and probably inco­
herent in any case. The difficulty with this is that people 
often evaluate actions retroactively with respect to out­
comes on Large World uncertainties. For example, if the 
boat pops a leak and sinks, then you are accused of imple­
menting a ''bad" plan to save the missionaries. If you are a 
decision analyst, then you respond that a leak in the boat 
was not even in the realm of discourse at the time you for­
mulated the model; the event was vaguely relevant to the 
decision, but only marginally more relevant than a host of 
other variables which appear natural to eliminate from the 
analysis. The best we can do- and this is the thrust of the 
framework we propose in this paper-is to analyze flexi­
bility with special attention to Small World uncertainty, in 
an effort to gain clues as to how strategies thus analyzed 
will behave in the face of Large World uncertainty. 
3.0 Flexibility on Outcomes 
We define a decision problem as a triple [O(X), O(D), 
v(D,X)], where X is a vector of state variables [X1, ... .Xn1• 
n (X) is the space of outcomes over X, and D is a single 
decision with m alternatives [d1 , ... ,dm1· We will use capital 
letters to denote a variable or decision, and lower-case let­
ters to denote a corresponding value or alternative, respec­
tively: e.g., D denotes the decision, and d1 denotes a 
particular alternative for it; X is a state variable, and x 
denotes a particular value for X. We will also use O(X) to 
denote the set of possible values for X, where X can be a 
state variable or a decision: e.g., de n (D) and 
x e n (X) . The value function v(d,x) specifies the pay­
off/value/utility when action dis taken and outcome 
x e 0 (X) obtains. 
X may be defined probabilistically. If X is a random vari­
able, then P{XI�} denotes a probability mass or probabil­
ity density assignment on X, conditional on �, our prior 
state of knowledge. We will use E[v(D,X)I�] to denote the 
expected value of v(D,X). We will also use Ex[v(D,X)II�] 
to denote the same measure, subscripting by X to indicate 
that the expectation is taken with respect to X. 
Stigler [1939] presents a useful and intuitive notion of 
flexibility, which has been studied and extended by a num­
ber of other researchers (see, e.g., Marschak and Nelson 
[1962], Jones and Ostroy [1984], Epstein [1980], and 
Merkhofer [1975]). Stigler characterizes the flexibility of 
two alternative plants using the second derivative of their 
total cost curves: a less flexible Plant A has a second deriv­
ative that is strictly greater than the second derivative cor­
responding to a more flexible Plant B, for all possible 
output values X. Figure I demonstrates the idea. 
FIGURE 1. Stigler's approach to flexibility. 
x* X=Ou put 
Both plants achieve minimum cost at the same level of 
output x*, and Plant A actually beats Plant B for output 
x*. Yet intuitively, it seems that we should prefer Plant B 
because of the flexibility it gives us over a broader ranger 
of possible output values for X. 
Figure 2 shows the same kind of problem cast in decision 
terms. The decision depicted has three alternatives; the 
value curve for each is labeled by the decision alternative. 
In the sense introduced by Stigler, it appears that tf" is 
most flexible in that it returns nearly constant value over 
the entire range of X. 
FIGURE 2. Stigler-type flexibility for a decision problem 
with three alternatives. 
v(d,X) 
X 
We might say that a+" is most flexible, or least brittle, in the 
sense that it minimizes the cumulative distance between 
itself and the upper boundary of the value curves for each 
of the available alternatives. Though d* and a have value 
curves that peak more highly at separate points, a+" does 
not suffer the severe dips in value that d* and a show over 
broader ranges of values for X. Because X is given proba­
bilistically, we must weigh this cumulative distance by its 
probability of occurrence under P{XI�}. In the spirit of 
Stigler, let us entertain the following definition. 
Definition 1. The brittleness of action d; with respect to 
outcomes X is given by 
The least brittle action is the one that minimizes the pre­
ceding quantity. 
It is useful to observe the intended duality between the 
notions of flexibility and brittleness. Aexible strategies are 
less brittle because they do not ''break" as easily in the 
face of unexpected outcomes. Brittle strategies are less 
flexible because they do not respond effectively to new 
discoveries or unanticipated outcomes. 
Definition 1 seems to capture an intuitively appealing 
notion of flexibility following a standard approach from 
the literature. The following result shows that this notion 
of flexibility - which we will denote F VO• for flexibility 
with respect to outcomes -is already implicit in the Max­
imum Expected Utility (MEU) principle from decision 
theory. 
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Theorem 1: The optimal MEU action is the least brittle 
decision in the sense of Definition 1. 
Proof: Suppose the least brittle action db solves the equa­
tion 
(EQ2) 
arg min [ arg max l db= d. <Ex < d )v(d,X) -v(d;,X>i �J ) ' 
We can expand the right-hand side as follows: 
(EQ3) 
The first term inside the bracketed expression is a constant 
function, the upper envelope of the certainty equivalent 
curves for the different decision alternatives. Therefore 
minimizing the entire bracketed expression amounts to 
maximizing the second term inside the bracket -but this 
term is just the MEU decision, and the result follows. o 
Theorem 1 shows that flexibility with respect to outcome 
is already embedded in the MEU principle from decision 
theory. In effect, any time one performs decision analysis, 
one gets F vo for free. While the result might seem to triv­
ialize our current notion of brittleness, it actually indicates 
where the useful work lies: to establish a clear notion of 
flexibility or brittleness which is tied to what we might call 
variability over belief, not simply variability over out­
come. 
4.0 Flexibility and Information 
Revelation: The Static Case 
When we face the possibility of receiving missing but 
knowable information, we use Bayes' Rule to update our 
beliefs. It is precisely the prospect of receiving new infor­
mation on a Small World uncertainty that leads us to revise 
- or wish that we could revise - an upstream commit­
ment. If we do not have such information on-hand, we 
cannot update a probability assessment with which to 
make a more informed decision. For Large World uncer­
tainty, the variable we would update has not even been 
introduced into the analysis. 
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If we are using parameterized probability distributions to 
represent our uncertainty, however, it is possible to ask 
how new information could affect our decisions over the 
entire range of what we might discover. Missing but know­
able information allows us to update parameters on uncer­
tainties within a decision model. Even if we do not have 
such information on-hand, we can nevertheless measure 
the extent to which decision strategies shift in response to 
perturbations in our beliefs about underlying uncertainties. 
Thus, flexibility analysis should focus on second-order 
uncertainty, and, in particular, sensitivity to second-order 
uncertainty (see, e.g., [Howard, 1988], [Pearl, 1988], 
[Heckerman and Jimison, 1987], [Chavez, 1995].) 
For simplicity, assume a decision model with a single 
uncertainty P{XI�} parameterized by a parameter 1t. For 
example, if X is a binomial or geometric random variable, 
then 1t could be the probability of success. Suppose that a 
decision maker assesses a value function v(d,x) and a prior 
probability 1t0 for P{XI�}. In Figure 3, we graph the cer­
tainty equivalent lines for three alternatives, i.e., 
E[v(d,x)l1t,�]. Notice that, in contrast to Figure 2, we are 
in expected-value space (not value space), and that 
E[v(d,x)l1t,�] is always a straight line because expectation 
is a linear operator. Each certainty equivalent line is 
labeled by its corresponding decision alternative; tf is the 
MEU action. 
FIGURE 3. Certainty equivalent lines for a decision 
problem with three alternatives. 
E [ v (d, X) I x, I;] 
B 
1t 
Given the decision maker's prior assessment 1t0, d* is 
clearly the optimal alternative. If the decision maker 
receives new information which he uses to update 1t , then 
his optimal alternative quickly shifts; it seems logical to 
say that d* breaks too easily when new information 
becomes available. 
Suppose P{ 1t I� } is the maximum entropy (i.e., uni­
form) distribution on the unit interval. The distribution 
reflects maximum uncertainty regarding what could be 
discovered about 1t , and thereby serves as the natural 
baseline of comparison for flexibility analysis. If we con­
sider the upper envelope of the certainty equivalent curves 
as the best expected value the decision maker can achieve 
over the entire range of what he could discover about 1t , 
then tf•s cumulative distance from that boundary equals 
(A+B+C), while cf's distance from the boundary is 
(D+C). For evocative purposes, we intend that 
(A+B+C)>>(D+C). These areas represent the total 
expected value that the decision-maker could harness by 
doing otherwise given missing but knowable information. 
In this sense, we assert that ct is less brittle than tf with 
respect to variability of belief. Or, equivalently, we say 
that ct is more flexible under information revelation than 
tf. 
Definition 2: Suppose that n parameterizes P{XI �},and 
that P{ nl �} is the uniform distribution. The brittleness 
or action d1 with respect to variability or belief n is 
given by 
(EQ4) 
The least brittle action in this sense is the one that mini­
mizes the preceding quantity. 
4.1 An Example: The Party Problem 
To see how this analysis works, consider the problem of 
determining where to have a party. The alternatives are 
"outdoors,'' "porch,'' and "indoors," and the uncertain deci­
sion variable is the weather, which can have two out­
comes, either "rain" or "shine." Suppose that we represent 
our decision maker's utility via the following pay-off func­
tion (in dollars) with a set of decision alternatives D=[Por-
ch,Outdoors, Indoors] and two possible states of the world 
for weather, {rain, shine}. 
TABLE 1. Decision maker's payoff for Party Problem . 
Outdoors 
Porch 
Indoors 
Sun Rain 
100 
90 
40 
0 
20 
50 
Let X denote the Bernoulli state variable on weather, and 
suppose that the decision maker assesses a 0. 8 chance of 
sunshine on the day of the party. It is easy to verify that the 
optimal MEU decision d* is to have the party Outdoors, 
with expected value $80. 
The decision maker is relatively confident about the proba­
bility of sunshine, and thus it is little surprise that the anal­
ysis suggest a party outdoors. He would like to understand 
his decision better, but he is reluctant to spend a lot of time 
analyzing it (buying groceries and setting up for the party 
are more urgent worries), and he is unwilling to spend too 
much time trying to examine all the possible evidence he 
could gather that would lead him to change his mind. He 
decides to perform a quick flexibility analysis, to answer 
the question, "How could missing but knowable informa­
tion revealed later affect my ability to achieve value now?" 
The breakpoint probabilities are . 375  and .667, approxi­
mately, and it straightforward to verify that the certainty 
equivalent (CE) curves for the three alternatives are given 
as functions of n: , the probability of sunshine, as follows: 
Porch: CEp(n:) = 20+70n: 
Indoors: CE1(n:) = 50-IOn: 
Outdoors: CE0(n: )= lOOn: 
A sample calculation of the brittleness of the Indoors alter­
native with respect to variability of belief on n: proceeds 
as follows: 
0.667 1.0 
J ((20+701t)- (50-lO!t}}d!t+ J (lOO!t- (50-tox))d!t 
0.375 0.667 
= ( 40�-301t] lg:�� + (55�-SO!t] ��:�67 
= $17.30 
Decision Flexibility 83 
Similar analyses for Porch and Outdoors give brittleness 
measures of $7.29 and $12. 74, respectively. Thus, our 
analysis indicates that Porch is the most flexible, or least 
brittle, alternative. Its brittleness measure, $7.29, repre­
sents the cumulative expected loss to the decision maker 
without information that could lead him to believe differ­
ently about the probability of sunshine. 
4.2 Flexibility and Clairvoyance 
Now consider the case where the decision maker is able to 
consult a clairvoyant free of charge. When the clairvoyant 
predicts "Sun," the decision maker moves the party out­
doors to achieve value 100, while if the clairvoyant pre­
dicts "Rain," he moves the party indoors to achieve value 
50. As a function of n: , his certainty equivalent with free 
clairvoyance can thus be described as lOOn: +50(1-
n: )=50+50n:. The reader can verify that this line connects 
the intercepts at CE0(n: =l) and CE1(n: =0). 
A different but related measure of brittleness compares the 
cumulative difference in expected value that the decision 
maker achieves by sticking to a particular alternative and 
the expected value he achieves given free clairvoyance. 
The expected value given free clairvoyance is the gold 
standard for flexible action in a static model, because it 
represents the value the decision maker achieves by gath­
ering all missing but knowable information free of charge 
before taking action. 
Definition 3: Suppose that n parameterizes P{XI �},and 
that P{ Til�} is the uniform distribution. The brittleness 
of action d1 with respect to variability of belief n, given 
clairvoyance on X, is 
The least brittle action in this sense is the one that mini­
mizes the preceding quantity. 
The measure of brittleness in this sense preserves exactly 
the ordering on alternatives implied by Definition 2, and is 
always greater than or equal to the brittleness measure 
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given in Definition 2. In general, it seems to be slightly 
easier to calculate. An example for Porch is given below: 
1 
f ((50+ 501t) - (20 + 701t)) d1t 
0 
= [301t- 10x2] �� 
= $20 
Measures for Indoors and Outdoors are $30 and $25, 
respectively. 
5.0 Flexibility and Information 
Revelation: The Dynamic Model 
Recall that our primary concern in studying flexibility is to 
take action now which allows us to respond effectively to 
changing circumstances, and, in particular, to make opti­
mal use of information revealed in the future. Consider the 
simple two-period decision model depicted in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4. The general influence diagram for flexibility in 
could have achieved otherwise. The option to revise is typ­
ically never free, first because the information gathered at 
e will usually cost money or resources, and second 
because most real world revision decisions incur what we 
might call "switching costs. " Figures 5 and 6 illustrate two 
possible sets of certainty equivalent curves for the decision 
model depicted in Figure 4. We assume that X is binomial, 
that the decision maker's prior on X is 1t0, and that after 
evidence e, the decision maker's posterior on X is either 
1t or � . The cost of revision plus the cost of informa­
tion e is w. 
FIGURE 5. Scenario 1: Revision at R does not carry 
superior flexibility value. 
E [ v ( c, r, X) I •· ;] 
a dynamic model. o 
This simple decision scenario is characterized by a com­
mitment decision C, a reaction or revision decision R 
which temporally follows C, uncertainty X, information/ 
evidence e relevant to X which arrives before R is taken, 
and a value function v(c,r ,K). The arc from C toR denotes 
the fact that we remember the decision we took at C when 
we are downstream at decision R. 
Suppose now that C has one of three possible alternatives 
{tr ,tf,d*}, and that only d*"allows revision at R. In other 
words, a and d* are strong commitments in the sense that 
they do not allow revision, while tr allows the possibility 
of revision to a or d* at R. It is important to observe that tr 
is not necessarily more flexible than the other alternatives; 
the possibility to revise yields greater flexibility only if it 
allows us to achieve greater value downstream than we 
•• 0 1 
FIGURE 6. Scenario 2: Revision at R carries superior 
flexibility value. 
E [ v ( c, r, X) I •· ;] 
•• 0 
In both figures, dotted lines represent the certain equiva­
lents of the decision alternatives d* and a minus the cost 
w. In both, we represent the certainty equivalent line with 
information e by a heavy line; similar to the case with 
clairvoyance presented in Section 4.2, it is the line con­
necting the two outer intercepts of expected value 
achieved with information. For example, if we perform cf 
at C and then update our belief about x to equal ft after 
observing e, then we revise our decision to d* and achieve 
expected value at the level t shown in Figure 5. Traveling 
along this heavy line and taking its value at x = x' , our 
prior assessment, gives the value with flexibility of alter­
native ct. Since this point is below the expected value 
achieved with d*, ct does not yield superior flexibility 
value in scenario 1. 
In scenario 2, however, an analogous argument shows that 
ct yields superior flexibility value. After information e, we 
are able to achieve higher expected value in revising our 
decision than if we stick to a commitment d* or a. The 
value of the flexibility in a is just the difference indicated 
by F in Figure 6. We formalize this idea in the following 
definition. 
Definition 4: We are given a decision model with tempo­
rally ordered decision C and R, information e revealed 
before R and after C, and value function v(c,r,X'). Informa­
tion e is relevant to X. Then the flexibility value of a com­
mitment c with respect to the revelation of information 
e, denoted Fe(c), is given by 
(EQ6) 
m: Ee l:X Ex [v(c, r, X) I e, �1] - :�: Ex [v(c, r,X) I �] 
where the outside expectation of the first term is taken 
with respect to e and the inside expectation is with respect 
to X. The commitment which maximizes this quantity for 
values strictly greater than zero is the most flexible com­
mitment. 
5.1 Example 
Let us return to the Party Problem. Suppose now that the 
decision maker has the opportunity to commit to having 
the party outdoors or indoors; or he can accept a "soft" 
commitment to having the party on the porch, with the 
possibility of revising the porch decision later. If he 
chooses the porch now, he will have the opportunity to 
receive a meteorologist's report the day of the party. Sup­
pose that the meteorologist's report costs only $1, and he 
further estimates a switching cost of $5 to move plates and 
tables from the porch to his living room or from the porch 
to his backyard. Hence the total cost to revise his decision 
is $6. 
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Our decision maker is a bit less confident of the probabil­
ity of sunshine than before. He estimates the probability of 
rain at . 7; the optimal action is still to have the party out­
doors with expected payoff $70, if he chooses not to 
accept the Porch option. Suppose that the metereologist's 
one-day forecasts are highly reliable, with accuracy proba­
bility . 9  (i.e., if he says "Rain," then it rains with probabil­
ity .9, and if he says "Sun," then it is sunny with 
probability .9). 
Given these assessments, the decision maker's posterior on 
rain given a "Rain" report from the meteorologist is .79, 
and his posterior on sun given a "Sun" report is �95. Thus, 
if the meteorologist says "Sun," the decision-maker moves 
outdoors with expected payoff $95-$6=$89, and if he says 
"Rain" he goes inside with expected payoff $47.9-
$6=$41.9. Taking expectation over the preposterior on evi­
dence - in this example, the reader can verify that the 
preposterior probability that the meteorologist reports 
"sun" is.66 - we find that the expected payoff to the deci­
sion maker with the Porch option is $72.9. This number is 
the first term in Definition 4. The flexibility value is the 
difference between this $72.9 and $70, or roughly three 
dollars. 
Thus, in this example, the flexible alternative is the supe­
rior alternative, with an expected value difference to the 
decision maker of about $3. 
6.0 Conclusions and Future Directions 
The definition of flexibility as the ability to achieve value 
given the future revelation of missing but knowable infor­
mation allows us to examine decision strategies in a new 
light. We have shown that MEU fully captures one type of 
flexibility, what we have termed flexibility with respect to 
values on outcomes. We have also identified a distinct, 
possibly useful, notion of flexibility, what we call flexibil­
ity with respect to information revelation. By anchoring 
our analysis on the entire range of beliefs that we might 
hold about our uncertainty, it is possible to measure the 
relative brittleness or flexibility of alternate strategies as 
the change in expected value to the decision maker, given 
information that could lead him to act differently. Static 
and dynamic analyses of decision scenarios allow us place 
precise flexibility values on different strategies, in a man­
ner which confirms intuition for the simple problem con­
sidered here. Further work will focus on applying the 
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framework developed here to larger models with many 
decisions and on exploring more of the framework's theo­
retical implications. 
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